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First identified in May 2014 in China’s Sichuan Province, initial cases of H5N6 avian
influenza virus (AIV) infection in humans raised great concerns about the virus’s
prevalence, origin, and development. To evaluate both AIV contamination in live poultry
markets (LPMs) and the risk of AIV infection in humans, we have conducted surveillance
of LPMs in Guangdong Province since 2013 as part of environmental sampling programs.
With environmental samples associated with these LPMs, we performed genetic and
phylogenetic analyses of 10 H5N6 AIVs isolated from different cities of Guangdong
Province from different years. Results revealed that the H5N6 viruses were reassortants
with hemagglutinin (HA) genes derived from clade 2.3.4.4 of H5-subtype AIV, yet
neuraminidase (NA) genes derived from H6N6 AIV. Unlike the other seven H5N6 viruses
isolated in first 7 months of 2014, all of which shared remarkable sequence similarity
with the H5N1 AIV in all internal genes, the PB2 genes of GZ693, GZ670, and ZS558
more closely related to H6N6 AIV and the PB1 gene of GZ693 to the H3-subtype
AIV. Phylogenetic analyses revealed that the environmental H5N6 AIV related closely to
human H5N6 AIVs isolated in Guangdong. These results thus suggest that continued
reassortment has enabled the emergence of a novel H5N6 virus in Guangdong, as well
as highlight the potential risk of highly pathogenic H5N6 AIVs in the province.
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INTRODUCTION
Depending on their pathotypes, avian influenza viruses (AIVs) have inherently different
pathogeneses in the infection and distribution of lesions. According to pathotype, AIVs can divide
into non-pathogenic AIVs (NPAIV), low pathogenic AIVs (LPAIV), and highly pathogenic AIVs
(HPAIV). In birds, NPAIVs (e.g., H6N6) usually present no clinical symptoms; by contrast, LPAIVs
(e.g., H9N2) can cause mild respiratory or gastrointestinal infection, and HPAIVs (e.g., H5N1
and H7N2) can induce systemic, multi-organ infection, as well as high morbidity, and mortality
(Swayne and Halvorson, 2003; Yuan et al., 2014).
A continual threat to animal and human health, HPAIVs have caused infections and
deaths in not only countless birds, but also many humans. In 1997, the H5N1 HPAIV, the
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internal genes of which derived from the H6N1 NPAIV, infected
18 people in Hong Kong, six of whom died from the infection
(Claas et al., 1998; Subbarao et al., 1998). Furthermore, since
2003, the H5N1 HPAIV has caused outbreaks both in birds and
humans in more than 60 countries, including China (Yuan et al.,
2014; WHO, 2015a). Recently, H5-subtype HPAIV s—that is,
variants of different NA subtypes—have also caused outbreaks
in poultry in China (i.e., subtypes H5N1, H5N2, H5N5, H5N6,
and H5N8), as well as in South Korea (i.e., subtype H5N8), Japan
(i.e., subtype H5N8), Laos (i.e., subtype H5N8), and Vietnam
(i.e., subtypes H5N1 and H5N6; WHO, 2014d; OIE, 2015).
In March 2014, an outbreak of H5N6 HPAIV in poultry was
reported in Laos and, that April, in Vietnam (Wong et al., 2015).
Genetic studies have shown that the H5N6 virus has exchanged
genes from the H5N1 and H6N6 AIVs that circulate widely in
ducks (Shen et al., 2015). Although little is known about the
potential of these novel viruses to infect humans, a few isolated
cases have been detected. On May 6, 2014, one such case of
H5N6 infection in China’s Sichuan Province was fatal (CDC
China, 2014; WHO, 2014c), and later that year, another severe
case of infection occurred in Guangdong Province in December
(WHO, 2014a). As of February 2016, nine cases of H5N6 AIVs
infection in humans have been confirmed in China, six of them
in Guangdong Province (WHO, 2015b,c, 2016a,b,c).
Since 2013, several surveillance systems for pandemic
preparedness have been established in China, including those
at live poultry markets (LPM) and sentinel hospitals. These
surveillance systems have played a vital role in the early detection
of warning signs of AIV infection in humans. During our study’s
surveillance period, we isolated 10 H5N6 AIVs in environmental
samples from LPMs in Guangdong Province, and to better
understand their genetic diversity and evolution, we analyzed
their related epidemiological and sequence data.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethics Statement
This research was reviewed and approved by the South China
Agricultural University Experimental Animal Welfare Ethics
Committee (permit no. 2014-11).
Sample Collection
Beginning on April 16, 2013, in order to better monitor LPMs
for AIV contamination and assess the risk of AIV infection in
humans, environmental sampling programs were implemented
in Guangdong Province. Environmental samples were taken
from poultry excrement, epilator swabs, and sewage swabs—
the latter two from drains in meat preparation areas or around
cages—whereas chopping swab samples were gathered randomly
from butcher boards or knives at LPMs each week.
Virus Isolation
Samples were first tested for influenza A by using real-time
polymerase chain reactions (qPCR) in the laboratories of the
district’s Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
Positive influenza A samples were probed to detect subtypes H5,
H7, and H9 by using qPCR in local CDC laboratories, and results
were later verified by Guangdong’s CDC. H5-positive samples
were further analyzed by using qPCR to detect the presence of the
N6 gene. All qPCR-detected primers and probes were provided
by the Chinese CDC. Samples positive with H5N6 subtypes were
purified and propagated in 10-d embryonated chicken eggs free
of specific pathogens and stored at −70◦C until used. Subtypes
of the viruses were further identified by hemagglutination (HA)
inhibition assay. All experiments were carried out in animal
biosafety level 3 facilities.
Genomic Sequencing
Viral RNA was first extracted from allantoic fluid by using
an RNA extraction kit (QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit, Qiagen,
Hilden, Germany). Reverse transcription and polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) amplification of all eight gene segments used
pre-amplification reagents (PathAmpTM FluA, Life Technologies,
Guilford, Connecticut, USA). PCR products were purified
and quantified with a purification kit (AmpureXP, Beckman
Coulter, Porterville, CA, USA) according to the manufacturer’s
instructions. The full genomes of the viruses were sequenced with
a sequencing kit (Ion PGM Sequencing 200 Kit version 2, Life
Technologies), specifically with the kit’s Ion 316 Chip V2 and
according to the manufacturer’s instructions.
Sequence Analysis
To align and analyze the sequences, multiple sequences of the
representative AIVs were downloaded from GenBank databases
(Li et al., 2010; Yuan et al., 2014, 2016). Full-length gene
sequences were implemented and edited with Lasergene 7.1
(DNASTAR, Madison, Wisconsin, USA). A neighbor-joining
algorithm and maximum-likelihood trees model were estimated
for all eight genes—namely, HA, NA, PB2, PB1, PA, NP, M, and
NS—by using genetic analysis software [Molecular Evolutionary
Genetics Analysis (MEGA) version 6.06] with 1000 bootstrap
trials. Branches with bootstrap values exceeding 50% were
grouped together in the trees.
Nucleotide sequences obtained in our study, all listed by
their accession numbers, are currently available from GenBank
(Table 1).
RESULTS
Prevalence of the H5-Subtype AIV in LPMs
From April 2013 to December 2015, a total of 32,452 fecal and
swabs were collected from LPMs in 21 cities in Guangdong
Province (Table 2). Among all of the samples, 6865 (21.2%) were
positive for influenza A, 14.6% of which with the H5 subtype. The
H5N1 subtype was the most prevalent among the H5 subtypes,
followed by H5N6; also observed were H5N2, H5N3, H5N4,
H5N5, H5N7, H5N8, and H5N9. During the same period, we
selected 10 H5N6 subtypes among the 66 H5N6-positive samples
in different cities of Guangdong Province in different years to
analyze the evolution of the subtype (Table 1).
Phylogenetic Analysis of Surface Genes
The genomes of the 10 H5N6 AIVs isolated from environmental
samples were sequenced by using a next-generation sequencer
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7 (Ion PGM, Life Technologies). The complete genomes of the
10 samples were compared with nucleotide sequences of some
viruses in GenBank databases.
Phylogenetic analyses demonstrated the origin and
evolution of H5N6 AIVs in China. As results of the
phylogenetic analysis of H5 and related viruses show,
the HA gene of all 10 viruses clustered into clade
2.3.4.4 (Figure 1A) and thus related more closely to the
H5N2 HPAIV, A/chicken/Zhejiang/727159/2014(H5N2),
which circulates in Zhejiang Province (Figures 1A, 2).
In addition, QY025, QY197, QY208, GZ670, and ZS558
shared 98.5–99.9% highest nucleotide similarity with
A/chicken/Dongguan/2690/2013(H5N6) (GD-H5N6), JY137,
PY955, and ZS356 shared 99.1–99.6% highest nucleotide
similarity with A/chicken/Shenzhen/1395/2013(H5N6) (GD-
H5N6), and HY243 shared 99.1% highest nucleotide similarity
with JX-H5N6. More singularly, GZ693 shared 98.7% highest
nucleotide similarity with A/Guangdong/ZQ874/2015(H5N6)
(ZQ874), which was found to have recently infected human in
Zhaoqing, Guangdong Province.
Phylogenetic analysis of the N6-NA gene indicated that
it likely originated in H6N6 AIVs found in domestic ducks
in southern China (Huang et al., 2012). According to their
geographical location, the HA genes of H6-subtype AIV
can be identified as either of Eurasian or North American
lineage. As Figure 1B shows, those of Eurasian lineage
can be divided into two groups: Group 1 (ST192-like) and
Group 2 (ST4893-like) (Huang et al., 2012). All 10 viruses
were of Group 1 of Eurasian lineage, represented by A/wild
duck/Shantou/192/2004 (H6N6) (Figures 1B, 2). QY025,
QY197, and QY208 shared 97.2–98.8% nucleotide similarity
with A/chicken/Shenzhen/552/2013(H5N6) (GD-H5N6), JY137,
ZS356, HY243, and ZS558 shared 96.5–99.6% highest nucleotide
similarity with A/chicken/Dongguan/2685/2013(H5N6) (GD-
H5N6), PY955 shared 99.6% highest nucleotide similarity with
JX-H5N6, and GZ670 and GZ693 shared 96.0–96.9% highest
nucleotide similarity with ZQ874 isolated from a patient in
Guangdong. In all, these results suggest that the surface genes of
the 10 reassortant viruses derived from H5 and H6 AIV subtypes
circulating in poultry in China.
Phylogenetic Analysis of Internal Genes
Phylogenetic analyses of internal genes showed that the PB2, PB1,
PA, M, and NS genes of all 10 viruses were of Eurasian lineage
(Figures 1C–H). H5N6 AIVs did not cluster with H5N1 AIVs,
but formed an independent lineage (Figure 1).
In the PB2 gene, QY025, QY197, QY208, JY137, and ZS356
shared 99.1–99.9% highest nucleotide similarity with GD-H5N6,
whereas ZS356, PY955 and HY243 shared more than 99.4%
highest nucleotide similarity with JX-H5N6. GZ670, GZ693, and
ZS558 originated from H6-subtype AIVs and were ST339-like
viruses, represented by A/wild duck/Shantou/339/2000 (H6N2)
(Figure 1C).
From the PB1 gene, PY955 and HY243 shared 99.0–99.1%
highest nucleotide similarity with DG-H5N6, whereas the other
seven viruses shared more than 98.8% highest nucleotide
similarity with Vietnam-H5N6. Meanwhile, the PB1 gene of
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TABLE 2 | Environment surveillance of H5-subtype avian influenza viruses in Guangdong, 2013–2015.
City 2013 2014 2015
No. of No. of positive No. of No. of positive No. of No. of positive
samples collected samples collected samples collected samples collected samples collected samples collected
Total H5 Total H5 Total H5
Chaozhou –a – – 5 – – 582 96 0
Dongguan 321 37 23 588 24 13 4305 358 96
Foshan 31 2 0 464 121 12 1837 412 43
Guangzhou 274 2 2 655 39 4 169 90 0
Heyuan – – – 301 13 5 801 65 30
Huizhou – – – 80 56 11 350 141 12
Jiangmen – – – 690 204 17 1292 376 43
Jieyang – – – 311 190 49 683 215 22
Maoming 157 18 3 337 121 18 663 167 29
Meizhou 101 5 0 1050 121 10 1951 187 4
Qingyuan – – – 240 84 13 604 244 27
Shantou – – – 364 136 11 747 63 0
Shanwei – – – 64 14 5 421 35 0
Shaoguan – – – 105 35 1 535 105 7
Shenzhen 196 48 14 384 151 25 621 57 0
Yangjiang 343 69 – 1344 214 3 921 104 10
Yunfu 213 41 7 374 85 5 725 142 5
Zhanjiang – – – 84 32 6 415 45 5
Zhaoqing 405 108 18 110 27 2 1470 381 83
Zhongshan – – – 1021 529 155 1031 324 89
Zhuhai – – – 295 163 13 599 200 7
Total 2041 330 67 8866 2359 378 21,545 4176 554
(16.2%)b (20.3%)c (26.6%) (16.0%) (19.4%) (13.3%)
aUndetected.
bPercent positives of total collected samples in a year.
cPercent H5 positives of total positives samples in a year.
GZ693 shared highest nucleotide similarity with H3-subtype
AIVs.
Regarding the PA gene, ZS356, and HY243 shared 99.7–
99.3% highest nucleotide similarity with JX-H5N6, whereas the
other eight viruses shared more than 99.3% highest nucleotide
similarity with GD-H5N6. As for the NP gene, PY955, ZS356,
and HY243 shared more than 99.7% highest nucleotide similarity
with JX-H5N6, though the other seven viruses shared 99.4–99.8%
highest nucleotide similarity with GD-H5N6, and concerning
the M gene, all 10 viruses shared 99.6–100% highest nucleotide
similarity with JX-H5N6. Lastly, regarding the NS gene, PY955
and JY137 shared 97.6–99.9% highest nucleotide similarity with
JX-H5N6, whereas the other eight viruses shared 98.7–99.4%
highest nucleotide similarity with GD-H5N6.
In particular, the 10 environmental viruses shared more than
96.0% high nucleotide similarity with the H5N6 AIVs isolated
from patients in Guangdong. Phylogenetic analysis demonstrated
that the internal genes of seven AIVs isolated within the first 7
months of 2014 relatedmore closely to H5N1HPAIVs circulating
in poultry in China. By contrast, GZ670, GZ693, and ZS558
isolated in 2015 diverged from previously sequenced H5N6
AIVs and related more closely to H6N2 AIVs in the PB2 gene
(Figure 2).
Molecular Characterization
The HA gene of all 10 H5N6 AIVs showed the HPAIV amino
acid sequence RERRRKR↓G at the cleavage site of HA1 and
HA2. Amino acid residues Q226 and G228, according to H3
numbering, occurred in the receptor-binding pocket of HA1,
thus indicating that the viruses preferred to bind to the AIV
receptor (Ha et al., 2001). Each of the 10 AIVs had six potential
N-linked glycosylation sites at HA1 (26 or 27, 39, 181, 209, and
302) and two in HA2 (499 and 558). However, ZS558 revealed
A254T mutation in an extra potential glycosylation site, whereas
GZ693 exhibited six potential N-linked glycosylation sites inHA1
(i.e., at positions 27, 39, 180, 208, 230, and 301) and two in HA2
(i.e., at positions 498 and 557).
The NA proteins of JY137 and PY955 exhibited 12 amino
acid deletion residues (i.e., at positions 59–70) in the neck, which
could boost its virulence inmammals (Matsuoka et al., 2009). The
key antiviral neuraminidase inhibitor drugs sites of the NA and
M genes, such as position H275 of the NA gene (NA of GS/GD
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FIGURE 1 | Phylogenetic analyses of the open reading frames of H5N6-subtype avian influenza viruses. Viruses highlighted with black triangles (N) were
characterized in the present study. The tree was constructed using the neighbor-joining of Molecular Evolutionary Genetics Analysis 6.06, with 1000 bootstrap trials to
ensure confidence in the groupings.
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FIGURE 2 | Possible genetic contributions of known donor AIVs to the novel H5N6 avian influenza virus in Southern China. From top to bottom, the eight
genes in each schematic virus particle are the PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP, NA, M, and NS genes. Genes of the same lineage appear in the same color.
number) and position S31 of the M gene, showed no mutations
(Scholtissek et al., 1998; Suzuki et al., 2003).
The PB2 gene of the 10 isolated viruses was E at position 627
and D at position 701, which indicates that all isolated viruses
derived from avian sources (Li et al., 2005). At the same time,
all environmental viruses were M at position 317 of the PB1
protein, which implies that they are hardly either pathogenic
or non-pathogenic to mice (Katz et al., 2000). The AIVs could
suppress a host’s antiviral defenses relative to the antiviral effects
of cytokines such as interferon. All viruses had P42S and D92E
mutations in the NS1 protein, which suggests that they could
enhance resistance to cytokines (Jiao et al., 2008; Qi et al., 2009).
DISCUSSION
At present, H5N1 AIVs have become endemic in waterfowl
and domestic poultry in China, Southeast Asia, North America,
and Africa, where they have evolved into multiple phylogenetic
lineages (WHO/OIE/FAO, 2012). The regular transmission of
H5N1 HPAIVs among waterfowl and domestic poultry has
facilitated genetic diversity among circulating clades in poultry in
China (Duan et al., 2008; Vijaykrishna et al., 2008). In particular,
the AIVs of clades 2.3.2, 2.3.4, and 7.2 have cocirculated
predominantly in domestic poultry and waterfowl in China
continuously since 2007 (Smith et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2010;
Li et al., 2010). At the same time, evolutionary clades such
as 2.3.4.5 and 2.3.4.6—recently redefined as clade 2.3.4.4—have
been reported (Gu et al., 2013). Moreover, H5-subtype AIVs
from clade 2.3.4.4 appear to be gradually replacing AIVs from
clade 2.3.4.2, especially in waterfowl. InMarch 2014, an emergent
H5N6 AIV caused an outbreak in poultry in Laos (Wong et al.,
2015), and later, a flock of ducks was infected with H5N6 AIVs
in Guangdong Province (Shen et al., 2015). Genetic analysis
suggested that subtypeH5N6AIVs originated from clade 2.3.2.1b
and variant clade 2.3.4 in H5N1 AIVs (Shen et al., 2015; Wong
et al., 2015). As phylogenic analysis shows, of the 10 H5N6
AIVs isolated as part of LPM surveillance during 2013–2015,
all environmental samples belonged to novel clade 2.3.4.4 and
probably evolved to form a new subcluster, unlike those of
H5N6 s previously identified in Sichuan Province.
Alongside HA evolution, the NA gene of H5N1 AIV has
frequently reassorted with other subtypes of AIVs circulating
in poultry (Zhao et al., 2008; Neumann et al., 2010). The new
reassortments, including H5N3, H5N6, and H5N8, together with
H7N9 and H9N2, are currently cocirculating in domestic poultry
and waterfowl worldwide. In our study, H5N6 AIVs were natural
recombinants, the NA gene of which derived from H6N6 AIVs
circulating broadly in ducks in southern China. Within the first
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7 months of 2014, internal genes of H5N6 reassortants were
derived from the genetic backbone of the H5N1 subtype (Wu
et al., 2015). Interestingly, for H5N6 viruses isolated after 2015,
we noted the divergence of three H5N6 reassortants—namely,
GZ670, GZ693, and ZS558—isolated after 2015 (Figure 2). The
PB2 genes of GZ670, GZ693, and ZS558 were not grouped into
the same clusters as other reported H5N6 viruses, but within
the same clusters as H6N2 AIVs. Furthermore, the PB1 gene of
GZ693 was clustered as a H3-subtype AIV. These results indicate
that H5N6 AIV is constantly evolving, and as such, novel AIVs
possessing H5- and H6-derived internal genes and other AIVs
possessing specific mammal-derived mutations could enhance
virulence and transmissibility in humans.
After December 2014, the first H5N6 AIV infections in
humans in Guangdong Province seemed to an appeared to stop.
From December 2015 to January 2016, however, five H5N6 AIV
infections in humans were reported in Guangdong Province
(WHO, 2014b, 2016a,b,c). Consistent with the evolution of
H5N6 AIVs isolated from LPMs, the sequences of H5N6 AIVs
isolated from patients are constantly evolving. The whole gene
sequences of the first human H5N6 AIV were similar to those
of the H5N6 AIVs isolated in early 2015 in LPMs in Guangdong
Province. Meanwhile, the whole gene sequences of the other four
human H5N6 AIVs were consistent with those of H5N6 AIVs
isolated from LPMs in late 2015. Molecular characterization and
phylogenetic analysis exhibited a highly close genetic relationship
between the viruses isolated from humans and LPMs, thereby
suggesting that infection in humans might be caused by the LPM
environment.
LPMs have been deemed potential hotbeds for infection
with H5N1 and H7N9 AIVs in humans (Wan et al., 2011; Shi
et al., 2013). Some human–human transmission of AIVs (e.g.,
H5N1 and H7N9) has been reported (Wang et al., 2008; Qi
et al., 2013), and as of February 2016, nine confirmed human
infections with subtype H5N6 had occurred in China’s Sichuan,
Guangdong, and Yunnan Provinces (CDC China, 2014; WHO,
2015b,c, 2016a,b,c). In particular, the patient infected with H5N6
AIV in Guangzhou had visited an LPM before the onset of illness
and could have acquired the infection there (Yang et al., 2015).
The other patient infected with H5N6 AIV and who died in
Sichuan Province was a merchant at a local LPM. Moreover,
the other seven cases of infection had visited LPMs in the past.
Perhaps above all, we isolated 10 H5N6 AIVs in LPMs, which
indicates that LPMs are potential sources of AIV infection in
humans.
In conclusion, we analyzed the evolution of H5N6 samples
isolated from LPM environments. Epidemiological and
experimental data suggest that the H5N6 subtype currently
has a limited capacity for chicken–human or environment–
human transmission. LPMs can provide sufficient opportunities
for close contact among waterfowl, domestic poultry, mammals,
and humans, as well as potential AIV infection, which in turn
results in the emergence of novel AIVs. Large-scale surveillance
of LPMs therefore continues to be essential to identifying
novel reassortants and sequence mutations among existing AIV
subtypes.
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